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Background
• Section 201 of SOX imposed significant restrictions on 
NAS that auditors can provide to their audit clients. 
? Section 201 proponents claim that the joint provision 
of audit and NAS to the same client may impair 
auditor independence and audit quality, and therefore 
lead to bad investment decisions.
? Opponents argue that restricting NAS may damage 
the synergy between audit and NAS, and would 
therefore reduce rather than enhance audit quality. 
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Objective
• To analyze the effects of Section 201 of SOX on 
• The auditor’s decision to exert effort to collect audit 
evidence (i.e., the audit quality decision)
• The auditor’s willingness to express an opinion that 
faithfully reflects the evaluation of what has been 
discovered during the audit (i.e., the audit report 
decision)   
• The reliability of audit reports (i.e., the joint product of 
audit quality and audit report decisions)
• The efficiency gain that can be obtained from an audit
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Literature Review
• Dopuch, King and Schwartz (2004) 
? An increase in contingent economic rents, which they 
interpret as a decrease in dependence in appearance, 
will trigger an increase in audit quality when the 
misstatement risk is moderate such that the auditor 
always report faithfully.  
• Kornish and Levine (2004)
? Restricting NAS might lead to biased audit reports.
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Contribution
• This paper provides an economic framework to study the 
effects of Section 201 of the SOX.
• My analysis indicates that Section 201 of the SOX might 
have some unintended negative consequences.
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Main Model Features
• The model has two important features:
1. The joint provision of audit and NAS creates synergies 
that leads to economic rents that can only be 
materialized if the auditor issues an unmodified report.
2. The audit report is the result of the two strategic 
decisions made by the auditor (i.e., the audit effort and 
audit report decisions). 
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Main Model Features
• Economic tensions captured in the model:
? The auditor will lose the opportunity to earn economic 
rents from consulting business if he issues a modified 
opinion, but failing to issue a modified opinion exposes 
the auditor to lawsuit.
? The opportunity to provide NAS to the same client and 
the synergy between these services might not only 
induce the auditor to suppress the unfavorable audit 
evidence (if one exists), but also offer an additional 
incentive to the auditor to exert a higher audit effort.
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Sequence of Events in the Model
t = 0 An initial owner who wishes to sell the entire firm to outside 
investors claims the firm’s type is good and hires an auditor to 
attest to his claim by paying a market-determined flat audit fee, F. 
The auditor exerts effort to collect audit evidence on the firm’s 
type,  privately observes the value of a consulting opportunity that 
might arrive at date 1, and then decides whether to agree, A, or 
disagree, D, the owner’s claim.
Given the audit report, the investors buy the firm by paying V and 
then to invest I in the firm’s initial project, P, if, and only if, the 
firm receives the unmodified report, A. If investors do not buy, the 
game ends, with the initial owner of the firm incurring a loss 
equal to F.
• One period model with events taking place at three dates.
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Sequence of Events in the Model
t = 1 A new project, S, is available to the firm if the firm implemented 
the initial project. 
The firm hires the incumbent auditor to provide consulting 
services for the new project.
t = 2 The firm realizes cash flows from its projects. The true firm type 
is revealed if project P fails.
The investors sue the auditor if, and only if, the firm is revealed to 
be a bad type. The court assigns damage awards if the auditor is 
held liable.
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Auditor’s Effort and Report Decisions
Pr( | , ) 1   and   Pr( | , ) .g G a b B a a= =
• Audit Technology: conditional probabilities of audit 
evidence, g or b, being privately observed by the auditor, 
given the firm’s true type, G or B, and the audit effort, a, are 
characterized by: 
• A consulting opportunity arrives only after the firm receives 
an unmodified opinion.  Owing to synergy effects, the joint 
provision of audit and NAS yields an additional benefit of      
{0,  } with Pr( | ) ,  where  0.K K K a aω ω∈ = >
Assumption:  (1 )K p Lτ > −
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Auditor’s Effort and Report Decisions
Pr( | ) 1   and   Pr( | ) [0,  1].A g D b= ∈
Pr( | , ) 1 for all .D b K K=
• Auditor’s Opinion:
• Pre-SOX:
Pr( | , ) 0    and   Pr( | , 0) 1.D b K D b= =
• Post-SOX:                               where                                      
is the maximum amount of the additional benefit that is 
implied by the regulation to ensure faithful reporting: 
( ) min{ , },X KΔ = Δ (1 ) /p L τΔ≡ −




2max  ( ) (1 )[1 (1 )](1 ) .a a F ca aK a a p Lτω φ ωΠ = − + − − − − −
• Post-SOX:
21
2max  ( ) [ (1 )(1 )] (1 )(1 )(1 ) .a a F ca a a a p Lφ φ τω φΠ = − + + − − Δ− − − −
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Investors’ Decision and Social Surplus
• Investors buy the firm and undertake project P (and, 
subsequently, project S) if, and only if, the auditor issues an 
unmodified report. 
• Social surplus, which measures the efficiency gain that can 
be obtained from an audit, is defined as
• The assumption of perfect competition in both the capital and 
the audit markets implies zero expected payoff to both the 
investors and auditor, and therefore the initial owner’s ex ante 
expected payoff is the same as the social welfare, W(a). 
( ) ( ) .NSS a W a W≡ −
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Reliability of Audit Reports
* *(1 )a aω−
• Is measured by the joint probability of detecting a 
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Results
K• Section 201 of the SOX lowers      to     to ensure faithful 
reporting.
• Effect on marginal benefit from avoiding an audit failure: 
increased by
• Effect on marginal cost of audit effort: unchanged
Δ
• Effect on marginal expected consulting profit: decreased by
• Given that        , we have           ; implying that the auditor 
will optimally decrease his audit effort.
K >Δ
{ [1 2 (1 )] }A K aτω φ≡ − − − Δ
2 (1 )B aτω φ≡ − Δ
A B>








(1 ) /p L τΔ≡ −
Δˆ
Δ
* * #ˆ ˆ ˆ( )[1 ( )] ( )a a aωΔ − Δ = Δ
Δ?
Δ
* * # #( ( )) ( ( ))SS a SS aΔ = Δ? ?
Table 2: Effects of Section 201 of the SOX
(              is large) (              is moderate) (              is small)
Audit effort Decrease Decrease Decrease
Reliability of audit reports Decrease Increase Increase
Efficiency gain that can be 
obtained from an audit
Decrease Decrease Increase
is the unique value of at which 
is the unique value of at which 
.
Derek Chan, HKU 18
Regulatory Implications
• The condition described in the first scenario may be more 
descriptive when Section 201 of the SOX was enacted given 
that
? Consulting services have grown rapidly since the mid-
1970s, and by 2000, the Big Five audit firms has expanded 
into multidisciplinary service firms that earned more than 
half of their gross fees from NAS.
? The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has 
replaced joint-and-several liability with proportionate 
liability and most of the national audit firms are now 
limited liability corporations . 
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Conclusion
• While Section 201 of the SOX can be effective in restoring 
faithful reporting, it reduces auditors’ incentive to provide 
audit effort.
• If the adverse direct impact on the synergy between audit 
and NAS has to be significant in order to restore faithful 
reporting, this regulatory change might also result in an 
overall deterioration in the reliability of audit reports and the 
efficiency gain that can be obtained from an audit. 
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Thank you!
